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For many, limiting the applicability of the concepts of
morality and legal responsibility to solely our fellow man
seems right, proper, and grounded on a solid moral founda-
tion. During the past few years, however, the realization has
grown that such an attitude is both parochial and archaic. It
is a product of speciesism: that is, an arbitrary limiting of
moral and ethical concerns to members of only our own spe-
cies.' A shift in awareness and perception has led many to the
inevitable conclusion that justice only for man is a perverse
distortion of any meaningful concept of justice.
Despite a growing realization that animals feel pleasure,
feel pain, and possess an awareness of their own existence,2
society has afforded them no real protection from the domi-
nant species of man. Over sixteen million dogs, cats, and other
companion animals are killed each year in animal pounds.3
Over four billion animals are slaughtered in the United States
alone every year for food.4 It is estimated that between sixty
B.A., DePauw University; J.D., American University. Vice President, Animal
Legal Defense Fund; Co-founder and President, Animal Legal Defense Fund (Wash-
ington, D.C.). The author is a Staff Attorney, Maryland Public Defender's Office, and
also a private practitioner.
1. See generally P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics For Our Treatment
Of Animals (1975).
2. See D. Griffin, Animal Thinking (1984); D. Griffin, The Question of Animal
Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience (1981).
3. This is a direct result of the fact that people often take in or adopt pets on
' impulse, with little or no understanding of the liabilities and responsibilities involved.
See A. Beck & A. Katcher, Between Pets and People: The Importance of Animal
Companionship (1983).
4. M. Fox, Farm Animals: Husbandry, Behavior, and Veterinary Practice (1984).
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to one hundred million animals die in laboratories and re-
search facilities every year in the United States.5 Many wild-
life species are approaching extinction because of habitat de-
struction, predator control programs, hunting, and trapping.'
Although an array of federal, state, and local humane laws ex-
ist, they are seldom enforced by already overworked and un-
derbudgeted government agencies.7
This article asserts the position that animals need legal
recognition of their inherent rights and interests. They must
have access to our courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies so they may have their rights and interests given the
same consideration as that of any other legal entity. This arti-
cle also sets forth a framework of basic rights which are mini-
mally necessary to ensure justice for all animal species, in-
cluding man.
II. Personhood and Legal Rights
In a society which is increasingly conscious of the world as a
Animals that survive to be slaughtered have been raised in factory farms that in no
way resemble the bucolic image that most people conjure up when they hear the word
"farm." Animals in factory farms are considered as mere machines with no considera-
tion whatsoever for their natural instincts, physical requirements and emotional
needs. They are manipulated to maximize production regardless of the consequences
to their health or ours.
5. It must be understood that the vast majority of these animals are used to test
items such as hairsprays, oven cleaners, floor polishes, and other similar products
deemed necessary for modern life. The remaining millions of animals used in research
suffer through agonizing lives of experimental or behavioral studies that are often
useless, redundant, counter productive, and morally indefensible. See generally J.
Diner, Physical and Mental Suffering of Experimental Animals (1979); B. Kuker-
Reines, Environmental Experiments on Animals: A Critique of Animal Models of Hy-
poxemia, Heat Injury and Cold Injury (1984); B. Kuker-Reines, Psychology Experi-
ments on Animals: A Critique ,of Animal Models of Human Psychopathology (1982);
D. Pratt, Alternatives to Pain in Experiments on Animals (1980); A. Rowan, Of Mice,
Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research (1984); R. Ryder, Victims
of Science: The Use of Animals in Research (1983); Nonanimal Research Methodolo-
gies: Proceedings of a Symposium (A. Posner, ed. 1981).
6. See generally M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (1983); L.
Regenstein, The Politics of Extinction (1975). Habitat destruction is a major cause of
species extinction. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
7. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Senate
Subcomm. on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies, Comm. on Ap-
propriations: Dep't of Agriculture's Animal Welfare Program (1985).
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seamless web of life, the notion of legal rights for animals is
hardly a far-fetched one. Yet, when speaking of animal rights
in a legal context, some fundamental facts must be under-
stood at the outset. First, there is no universally accepted def-
inition among legal philosophers of the term "legal right" or
its origin.8 Second, animals in the United States possess no
legal rights. It is true that individual animals are the objects
of various federal and state humane and anti-cruelty laws,
and entire species of animals are the object of endangered'
species laws.9 However, being the object or beneficiary of a
law does not necessarily create a right to specific treatment by
the law at the behest of the beneficiary. Third, whatever place
in the law animals now occupy, it is safe to say that they are
variously considered as dumb beasts,10 personal property, 1 or
what are known traditionally as ferae naturae (a sort of eco-
logical adornment held in trust by the federal or state govern-
ments for the use and enjoyment of human citizens). 2 Thus,
8. Hohfeld sets forth a scheme of "jural opposites" and "jural correlatives" for
use in jurisprudential reasoning. Under that framework, "a duty is the invariable cor-
relative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim." Thus,
when a right is invaded, a duty is violated. See W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Con-
ceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 35-38 (W. W. Cook ed. 1964). As to the
origin of legal rights, let it not be forgotten that legal rights, and in fact the law itself,
are not the product of natural causes, divine intervention, nor some mythical primal
contract. The law is what we make it; legal rights are the expression of a particular
world view coupled with political power and action in the broadest sense.
9. See generally E. Leavitt, Animals and Their Legal Rights: A Survey of Ameri-
can Laws from 1641 to 1978 (1978). See also Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1982); Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1982); Horse
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831 (1982); Tule Elk Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 673d-673g (1982); Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1982); Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-711; Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 715-715s; Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1340 (1982). Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982); Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982); Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1982).
10. See D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law (1983).
11. See, e.g. Graybill v. State, 672 P.2d 138 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds 695 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1985); Grooms v. State, 673 P.2d 162 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983); Irwin v. State, 658 P.2d 64 (Wyo. 1983).
12. The doctrine of ferae naturae gives one who captures a wild animal a prop-
erty or ownership interest in that animal. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) ("a fox is an animal ferae naturae, and . . . property in such
animals is acquired by occupancy only.").
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for example, whether one is a bird hunter or a bird watcher,
birds are recognized in the law only to the extent that they
have a perceived value to human beings.
Despite the ambiguities associated with the concept of a
legal right, a working definition may be formulated as follows:
(1) A legal right is recognized as such by the law
and thereby protected from destruction or
infringement.
(2) The entity holding the right can seek legal
protection on its own behalf.
(3) The assertion of the right should protect the
entity from injury.
(4) The relief the law provides should directly
compensate or benefit the holder of the right.
(5) Incapacity on the part of the holder of the
right does not preclude a representative from protect-
ing the best interests of the holder of the right.
Although animals have been the subject matter and ob-
ject of litigation, they currently have no rights which may be
asserted in court in the quest for justice for themselves and
their kind.' 3 No legal precedents currently exist which allow
animals to assert legal rights on their own behalf, 14 although a
growing body of philosophical and legal literature support
such a proposition.1 5
13. For example, in State v. Hudson, 420 A.2d 286 (Me. 1984), the humane soci-
ety, not the actual animal victim, was considered the victim after an animal cruelty
conviction, and received the damage award.
14. But see Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F.Supp.
985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), where the Palila (a type of
bird) was the first named plaintiff in the suit, although the suit did not rely on the
Palila as a party, nor did the court consider the Palila as a party.
15. In the field of moral philosophy, see, e.g., T. Regan, The Case For Animal
Rights (1983); T. Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights and Envi-
ronmental Ethics (1982)); B. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality (1981); H.
Salt, Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress (1982); P. Singer,
supra note 1; Ethics and Animals (H.B. Miller & W.H. Williams eds. 1983). In the
field of legal theory, see, e.g., C. Stone, Should Trees Have Legal Standing? Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects (1974); Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 205 (1975); Dichter, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and Animal
Rights, 7 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 147 (1978); Morris, The Rights and Duties of
[Vol. 2
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The evoluntionary process intrinsic to the common law
has led to the recognition of legal rights for many people who
historically were considered subhuman and therefore pos-
sessed no legal rights. Recall that the United States Supreme
Court once held that a black man had no rights that a white
man need respect; 6 yet today such a viewpoint is considered
aberrant and absurd. Our law also recognizes a variety of arti-
ficial entities that possess rights that are protected from in-
fringement. As holders of legal rights, entities such as mari-
time vessels, corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, and
governmental bodies may sue on their own behalf. The legal
fiction that these entities are "persons" is generally recognized
by the common law countries of the world.17
The notion that "personhood" is a prerequisite to the
conferring of legal rights is a common theme in the law.'8
Thoughts on the essence of "personhood" or humanity have
evolved over the centuries. The significance of the efforts to
identify "personhood" is that in actuality it represents a quest
to separate human beings from the rest of the living world.' 9
Beasts and Trees: A Law Teacher's Essay for Landscape Artists, 17 J. Leg. Ed. 185-
92 (1964); Comment, Rights for Nonhuman Animals: A Guardianship Model for
Dogs and Cats, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 484 (1977). It has also been advocated that
inanimate objects such as trees have standing to sue in court. See generally Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-53 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting); C. Stone, supra.
16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
17. Note also that the legal rights of the mentally incompetent or disabled are
established and protected by guardians and "next friends."
18. In the abortion context, the United States Supreme Court has found that a
human fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore
a fetus cannot claim protection under the fourteenth amendment. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
19. The abortion literature contains many discussions of the nature of "per-
sonhood" and its relevance to the morality of abortion. See, e.g. Tooley, Abortion and
Infanticide, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 37 (1972), in Values in Conflict (B. Leiser ed. 1984) at
59; English, Abortion and the Concept of a Person, 5 Can. J. Phil. 233 (1975), in
Values in Conflict, supra, at 83. Tooley treats the concept of a person as a purely
moral concept, free of all descriptive content. Using this definition, "it seems . . . that
while it is not seriously wrong to kill a newborn kitten, it is seriously wrong to torture
one for an hour. This suggests that newborn kittens may have a right not to be tor-
tured without having a serious right to life." Tooley, supra. English refutes the argu-
ment that the personhood of the fetus determines its rights by stating "if a fetus is
not a person, that does not imply that you can do to it anything you wish. Animals,
for example, are not persons, yet to kill or torture them for no reason at all is wrong."
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Yet we have consistently shortened the list of our supposedly
unique attributes as we have discovered similar attributes
possessed or displayed by species other than our own. As
other species are discovered to possess a particular attribute
that was previously ascribed as unique to human beings, we
have reacted by arbitrarily deciding that the specific attribute
in question was not essential to our claimed uniqueness. Thus,
our assumed moral supremacy and legal hegemony remain in-
tact. The notion that human beings are unique, that what sep-
arates "us" from "them" is a difference in kind rather than
merely one of degree, has been the basis for our refusal to ex-
tend the scope of our moral universe beyond our own species.
One example of this process involved the early belief that
man's uniqueness was based on his ability to manufacture and
use tools to modify his environment.2" However, ethological
field studies have shown that various species ranging the en-
tire phylogenetic scale make and use tools.2" Although tool use
has thus been shown not to be a distinguishing characteristic
of man, many have simply discarded the idea that it was an
attribute essential to "personhood" rather than question the
validity of such a homocentric concept itself.
The current last bastion of human uniqueness is our pre-
sumed monopoly on the ability to fashion and use language.
Fitting neatly in the Cartesian tradition that all non-human
animals are mere unfeeling, non-thinking automata, some
maintain that language is the genetic essence of humanity.2 2
English, supra.
20. For a critical discussion of this earlier view see A. Jolly, The Evolution of
Primate Behavior (2d ed. 1985).
21. See generally B. Beck, Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of
Tools by Animals (1980); see also J. van Lawick-Goodall, In the Shadow of Man
(1971); W. Kohler, The Mentality of Apes (2d ed. 1927); G. Teleki, The Predatory
Behavior of Wild Chimpanzees (1973); Goodall, Tool-using and Aimed Throwing in a
Community of Free-Living Chimpanzees, 201 Nature 1264 (1964); Hall & Schaller,
Tool Using Behavior of the California Sea Otter, 45 J. Mammalogy 287 (1964); G.
Teleki, Chimpanzee Subsistence Technology: Materials and Skills, 3 J. Hum. Evol.
575 (1974).
22. Noam Chomsky posits the existence of a hypothetical neural language origin
in the human brain. See Chomsky, Initial States and Steady States, in Language
and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky 107 (M.
Piatelli-Palmarini ed. 1980). See also Chomsky, Rules and Representations, 3 Behav.
[Vol. 2
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Yet in light of scientific research conducted on the communi-
cative skills of honey bees,23 ants,24 canids,25 monkeys, 26 dol-
phins,2 7 gorillas,28 chimpanzees, 29 and other species, the defini-
tions of language have constantly been modified in an attempt
to exclude non-human communicative skills. As one commen-
tator has lamented:
[Ilt is not that we have discovered them [non-human
species] to lack a language but rather that we define, and
redefine, what [1]anguage is by discovering what beasts do
not have. If they should turn out to have the very thing
we have hitherto supposed language to be, we will simply
and Brain Sci. 1 (1980); cf. P. Lieberman, The Biology and Evolution of Language
(1984).
23. See K. von Frisch, The Dancing Bees: An Account of the Life and Senses of
the Honey Bee (1966); K. Von Frisch, Bees: Their Vision, Chemical Senses, and Lan-
guage (1964).
24. See B. Holldobler, Communication by Tandem Running in the Ant, 90 J.
Compar. Physiology 105 (1974); see also Holldobler, Communication in Social Hy-
menoptera, in How Animals Communicate 418 (T. Sebok ed. 1977).
25. See L. Mech, The Wolf: The Ecology and Behavior of an Endangered Species
(1970); L. Mech, The Wolves of Isle Royale (1960); see also B. Lopez, Of Wolves and
Men (1978); The Wild Canids: Their Systematics, Behavioral Ecology, and Evolution
(M. Fox ed. 1983).
26. See Struhsaker, Auditory Communication among Vervet Monkeys, in Social
Communication Among Primates 281 (S. Altmann ed. 1967); see also The Meaning of
Primate Signals (R. Hanne & V. Reynolds eds. 1984).
27. See J. Lilly, Lilly on Dolphins (1975).
28. See Patterson, The Gestures of a Gorilla: Language Acquisition in Another
Pongid, 5 Brain and Language 72 (1978); see also F. Patterson & E. Linden, The
Education of Koko (1981).
29. See Gardner & Gardner, Early Signs of Language in Child and Chimpanzee,
187 Sci. 752 (1975); Gardner & Gardner, Evidence for Sentence Constituents in the
Early Utterances of Child and Chimpanzee, 104 J. Exptl. Psychology 244 (1975);
Gardner & Gardner, Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee, 165 Sci. 664 (1969);
Gardner & Gardner, Two Way Communication with an Infant Chimpanzee, in Be-
havior of Nonhuman Primates (A. Schrier & F. Stollnitz eds. 1971); see also D.
Premack & A. Premack, The Mind of an Ape (1983); D. Premack, Intelligence in Ape
and Man (1976); Fouts, Capacities for Language in Great Apes in Socioecology and
Psychology of Primates 371 (R. Tuttle ed. 1975); Premack, Language in chimpan-
zees, 172 Sci. 808 (1971); Premack, Interspecies Comparisons of Cognitive Abilities,
in Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky 203
(M. Piatelli-Palmarini ed. 1980); Rumbaugh, Gill, & von Glasersfeld, Reading and
Sentence Completion by a Chimpanzee, 182 Sci. 731 (1973).
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conclude that language is something else again.30
III. Legal Rights for Animals
If the criteria used to define "personhood" are objectively
shown to be satisfied by other species besides man, we simply
must accept the fact that we are not unique. We cannot ignore
our physical, mental and emotional evolution. 31 Logic dictates
that if a species shares with us those attributes that we be-
lieve make us essentially human, we must conclude that the
species in question is entitled to "personhood." The alterna-
tive is to discard the term altogether because it has no scien-
tific, moral or legal justification; it is a term with no descrip-
tive content.2 By clothing animals with the mantle of
"personhood" we recognize both their legal existence and the
concurrent entitlement of legal protection, to the extent con-
sistent with their nature. Such protection can only be effective
if animals possess the right to have their interests judged in-
dependently of the subjective values that humans place upon
them. As another commentator has observed:
Any rights for animals or nature at the aesthetic and
emotional level are extensions of the rights of people for
aesthetic and emotional enjoyment of things of nature,
which still do not have intrinsic rights themselves. What
is needed is an objective, rational, and ethical view of ani-
mals independent of self-serving human valuation. 3
What rights should we reasonably expect to be in the best
interests of animals? This question, of course, begs the more
30. S.R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals 96 (1977) (emphasis in original);
see also S.R.L. Clark, The Nature of the Beast: Are Animals Moral? (1982). For an
example of the thought process Clark decries, see Terrace, How Nim Chimpsky
Changed My Mind, Psychology Today, Sept. 1979, at 65.
31. See C. Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1979);
Law, Biology, and Culture: The Evolution of Law (M. Gruter & P. Bohannan eds.
1983).
32. See Tooley, supra note 19.
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fundamental issue of whether we may be presumptuous
enough or wise enough to believe that we know what is in
their best interests. However, a few basic rights which are
minimally necessary to ensure justice for all animal species
(including man) can be identified:
(1) All animals have a right to live out their lives accord-
ing to and in harmony with their nature, instincts, and
intelligence.
In the most general sense this requires that we govern our
way of living so as to live in harmony with all our fellow crea-
tures. It also requires that we cease interfering with the eco-
logical and ethological relationships between animals that
have evolved over the millenia.3 4
(2) All animals have a right to live in a habitat ecologi-
cally sufficient for normal existence.
This right recognizes the seamless web of life in which all
animals on this planet are enmeshed. There is almost univer-
sal agreement that the single greatest killer of animals is the
destruction or degredation of habitat.3 5 It is obviously in our
self-interest to protect and preserve the environment. More-
over, because all animals have a right to live in a healthy and
sustaining environment, it is also our duty to do so.
(3) All animals have a right to be free from exploitation.
Once a legal right has been conferred, a correlative duty
34. As a rather exotic example, the Serengeti ecosystem of eastern Africa has
been under intensive, multi-disciplinary study for more than twenty years by the Ser-
engeti Research Institute; the purpose of the Institute has been to generate data that
would assist in the rational management of Serengeti National Park by the
Tanzanian government. The fundamental conclusion that can be drawn from this
long-term study is that the best management is that which permits nature to run its
course while protected from the depredations of man. Ecological perturbations are so
long-term and complex that we simply do not possess the insight and knowledge to
interfere or "manage" without destructive results. Implicit is the idea that we are not
wise enough to "manage" a dynamic ecosystem that has taken millions of years to
evolve, and is continuing to evolve. See Serengeti: Dynamics of an Ecosystem (A.
Sinclair & M. Norton-Griffiths eds. 1979). Another example is the killing of whales
and other cetacea. For products we do not need or can easily replace with suitable
substitutes, stocks and species of cetacea have been decimated. See The Whaling
Question: The Inquiry By Sir Sydney Frost of Australia, 206-10 (1979).
35. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
19851
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exists for all others not to infringe upon that right."6 Necessity
is an insufficient rationale for denying any of the above-men-
tioned rights to animals. We need to share the earth with ani-
mals; however, we do not need to eat their flesh, wear their
skins, hunt or trap them, amuse ourselves at their expense, or
experiment on them.3 7
IV. Conclusion
We are a society comprised of individuals who pride our-
selves in believing that our best instincts lead us in a fervent
striving for peace and justice. We have made significant
strides in this regard for members of our own species. But
there are other animals on this earth who await their fair
share of peace, justice, and equality.
As Gandhi once observed, "[t]he greatness of a nation
and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals
are treated.'38 A truly just society respects all life. A respect
for all life entails recognition of legal rights for animals and
the correlative legal duties such rights confer. Without such
recognition, the scope of our moral universe is artificially nar-
rowed, and the risk of a future without animals grows greater.
The world will be a lonely place indeed if we have only our
fellow man as company.
36. See Hohfeld, supra note 8.
37. See generally K. Akers, A Vegetarian Sourcebook: The Nutrition, Ecology
and Ethics of a Natural Foods Diet (1983); M. Braunstein, Radical Vegetarianism: A
Dialectic of Diet and Ethic (1981); D. Dombrowski, The Philosophy of Vegetarianism
(1984); D. Giehl, Vegetarianism: A Way of Life (1979). See also C. Amory, Man
Kind? Our Incredible War on Wildlife (1974); D. Favre & G. Olsen, Surplus Popula-
tion: A Fallacious Basis For Sport Hunting (1982).
38. Bennon, Research Guide for Animal Welfare and Animal Rights, 4 Legal
References Services Q. 3 (1984). See also M. Fox, supra note 33, at 62.
[Vol. 2
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